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Case Notes and Statute Notes
TORTS-GOVERNMENT INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY-In the Absence of Liability under the Applic-
able State Good Samaritan Doctrine, the United States is not Liable
Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for Negligence in the
Inspection of Private Activities or Property, even though Federal
Statutes or Regulations Direct that Government Employees Under-
take the Activity. United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States,
614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
On October 8, 1968, a DeHavilland Dove aircraft caught fire in
midair and crashed shortly after its takeoff.' The post-crash investi-
gation indicated that the fire had begun in heaters which had been
defectively installed by the plane's previous owner.' Pursuant to
federal regulations,' the installation of the heaters had been in-
spected by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials. The
inspectors found the installation airworthy, and they issued a sup-
plemental type certificate documenting their approval.'
The DeHavilland Dove, a twin engine propeller driven airplane, seats eight
to ten passengers and two crew members.
I Brief for Appellant at 5, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
3 Id. at 7.
4 14 C.F.R. § 21.1113 (1980) requires that any person who makes a major
change in the design of an aircraft apply to the FAA for a supplemental type
certificate. Applicants must demonstrate that the altered aircraft meets applicable
airworthiness requirements. 14 C.F.R. § 21.1115 (1980). Issuance of supple-
mental type certificates is based upon the approval by the Federal Aviation
Administrator of the design change and the type certificate previously issued
for the aircraft. 14 C.F.R. S 21.1117 (1980).
The usual method of obtaining a supplemental type certificate involves sub-
mitting drawings and other detailed documentation to the FAA to allow it to
determine that the proposed installations will be airworthy and will meet FAA
standards. The modification cannot be performed until it is approved. A lower
level of documentation is permitted for only one or two aircraft installations,
provided that an FAA inspector examines the "as built" installation. If the
supplemental type certificate cannot be issued, the installation must be removed.
Reply Brief for Appellees at 3, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
5614 F.2d at 190.
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Plaintiffs filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) °
alleging that damages had resulted from the negligence of the FAA
inspectors who had is-ued the supplemental type certificate approv-
ing the defective installation of the heaters.! The district court
found that the United States was liable on grounds that the FAA
had been negligent in inspecting and certifying the aircraft and
that this negligence proximately caused the fire and crash.' On
appeal, the United States argued that the FTCA gives the district
courts jurisdiction to award damages against the government only
in situations where a private individual could be held liable pur-
suant to state law.' Consequently, the government contended that
a violation of FAA regulations cannot serve as a basis for liability
where the United States' role was simply one of conducting a safety
inspection because there is no analogous "private person" liability
for such activity." Held, reversed and remanded: In the absence of
The applicable portions of the FTCA are 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) and
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions or claims against the United States, for money damages
. . . for injury or loss of property, of personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. S 2674 (1976) states in part:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive dam-
ages.
Brief for Appellant at 6, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979). Three cases were filed for wrongful death claims,
for property damage, and another for subrogation. Brief for Appellant at 2,
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
s United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, Nos. 70-138, 71-36, 71-37, 71-39
(S.D. Cal., Apr. 2, 1975).
' United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1979).
1Id. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Alternatively, the govern-
ment argued that the plaintiffs were asserting a claim arising from "misrepre-
sentation," an exception to liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United
States also contended that the district court erroneously failed to find contribu-
tory negligence as to the claim of the insurance companies. Finally, the govern-
ment urged that the district court had erred in finding that the defective fuel
line to the combustion heater proximately caused the crash. Because the Ninth
Circuit accepted the government's argument that the FAA could not be held
liable for negligent inspection of aircraft absent a showing of analogous private
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liability under the applicable state good samaritan doctrine, the
United States government is not liable pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act for negligence in the inspection of private activities or
property, even though federal statutes or regulations direct that
government employees undertake the activity. United Scottish In-
surance Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
THE FAA AND LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
Although governmental liability under the FTCA had earlier
been explored in a variety of situations unique to aviation," prior
to United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States" one commenta-
tor remarked that "[g]overnmental liability for the negligent air-
worthiness certification of aircraft, however, is one area which
remains unsettled."" The question of governmental liability for
negligent certification of aircraft was first examined in Gibbs v.
United States.14 While the court in Gibbs found that the FAA
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident in ques-
tion, its opinion implied that the government might have been
liable if the plaintiff could have proved that the negligence of gov-
ernment employees had proximately caused the accident.'" The
court noted that "[h]aving decided to enter the broad field of the
regulation of the flight and repair and modifications of aircraft...
the Government becomes responsible for the care with which those
person liability under state law, the court did not rule on the other arguments
set forth by the government. 614 F.2d at 190.
"See Note, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for
Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 249 (1979). See,
e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) and United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 356 (1946) (government liability for excessive noise from air-
planes); Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971) (government lia-
bility to homeowners for sonic booms); Duncan v. United States, 335 F. Supp.
1167 (D.D.C. 1973) (government liability for negligent denial of pilot certifica-
tion).
1 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
13 Note, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for
Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 249 (1979).
14251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). This case involved a wrongful death
action in which the plaintiff alleged that the government had negligently certified
a jet after it had been modified. The government argued that pilot error was the
proximate cause of the crash.
Is Id. at 400.
19811
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activities are conducted."'"
The Gibbs rationale was strengthened in Rapp v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc." The court there held the government liable for failing
to prescribe in a type certificate that certain engines were not to
be used in areas where birds were known to congregate." Rapp
was followed by Arney v. United States," in which the court held
that because the government assumed responsibility for aircraft
safety by certifying aircraft, it could be held liable for negligently
performing its duties.' In Arney, the court noted that "[t]he pur-
pose of the certification of aircraft under the 1958 Act and regula-
tions was to reduce accidents, and the government may be held
liable for negligence in improper issuance of a type airworthiness
certificate."" Both Rapp and Arney, however, were brought pur-
suant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts, rather than
pursuant to jurisdiction under the FTCA.'
Air traffic controllers have also been the subject of negligence
16 Id.
'r264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by agreement, 521 F.2d 1399
(3d Cir. 1970).
1264 F. Supp. at 680. Sixty-two people died when an engine ingested a
number of birds during takeoff, causing the aircraft to crash. See Note, It's a
Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for Negligent Airworthi-
ness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 256 n.54 (1979), suggesting that the
government did not appeal the decision because it was attempting to bury what
it considered a dangerous precedent by engaging in extensive settlement negotia-
tions. The author reports that the plaintiffs stipulated that the lower court
judgment would be vacated in exchange for money from the government. More-
over, according to the author, the government sought to keep the case unpub-
lished. The author cites no authority for these propositions.
19479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).
'Id. at 658.
21 Id.
22 Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1973); Rapp v. East-
ern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by agree-
ment, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970). The Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 741-752 (1976), provides the exclusive remedy against the United States for
a maritime tort when the situs of the tort is within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the court. Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 577 (1943). Wrongful
death actions arising from the same accident as Rapp were held to be within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States in Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), the Supreme Court eliminated the Suits in
Admiralty Act as a basis for jurisdiction in suits arising out of airplane accidents
over navigable waters.
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suits for their failure to comply with FAA regulationsY. Federal
regulations state that "[a]n air traffic control operator shall per-
form his duties in accordance with... the procedures and practices
prescribed in air traffic control manuals of the FAA to provide for
the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.""' A wide
range of duties are owed to the air-travelling public by federal air
traffic controllers, and the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual
is used by courts when assessing the scope of the duty owed.'
Decisions have also held that these duties extend beyond those
required by the FAA manual." For example, the duty of air traffic
controllers to give warnings to pilots is based upon the simple
tort principle that once the government has assumed a function or
service, it is liable for negligent performance of that task."
In Clemente v. United States,' however, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected claims that a duty of care arises from the FAA
regulations." There, relatives and representatives of passengers
killed in the crash of a chartered private plane filed suit against
the government pursuant to the FTCA." The plaintiff alleged that
FAA employees had negligently failed to warn the passengers that
2See, e.g., Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977) (govern-
ment liable for negligence of air traffic controller who failed to warn private
aircraft pilot of wake turbulence created by commercial jet); Hartz v. United
States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969) (government liable for negligence of con-
troller who failed to warn small plane pilot of wing tip vortex of commercial
aircraft); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., United States v. Ingham, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) (government liable for
negligence of air traffic controller who failed to warn incoming aircraft that
visibility had dropped).
24 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1980).
2 See note 23 supra.
'See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.
1969) (controller must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him which are
not apparent to pilot exercising due care, whether or not warning is required
by manual); United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967) (warnings
beyond those prescribed by manuals must be given when danger is immediate
and extreme); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 355 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964)
(warnings beyond those set forth in manuals must be given when danger is
known only to federal personnel).
27 See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972).
21Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1976), motion for
reconsideration denied, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir.
1977).
29 Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1977).
'10d. at 1143.
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their aircraft was overweight and that it lacked a proper flight
crew."' Although the district court found for the plaintiffs on the
issue of negligence," the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and held that an order issued by a regional director of the FAA
regarding surveillance of large turbine-powered aircraft was not
sufficient to give rise to a duty the breach of which would create
a cause of action under the FTCA.' The court noted that failure
to perform the order could lead to internal discipline by the FAA,
but not to liability to the public.' The court pointed out that this
was the first case in the jurisdiction to allege such a basis for
liability.' The question of liability would be governed by the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Sections 323 and 324A, " the re-
quirements of which were not met." According to the court, there
was no statutory duty to offer special protection to the plaintiffs'
decedents, the failure to inspect the aircraft did not increase the
risk of injury, and there was no showing that any of the decedents
relied on the contents of the regional director's order so as to
adjust his safety precautions accordingly. 8 Finally, the court stated
that a contrary decision could impose limitless liability upon the
federal government by interpreting every command made by super-
visory or administrative staff to create a duty in the federal gov-
ernment owed to the beneficiaries of that command.3"
The Clemente court distinguished the air traffic controller cases'
on three levels." First, the court noted that air traffic controllers
operate under federal rules designed to establish standards of
care for their activities, regardless of whether they are private,
public, municipal or federal employees:' "[A] federal employee is
31 Id.
32 Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564, 576 (D.P.R. 1976), motion for
reconsideration denied, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir.
1977).
31 Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1977).
34 id.
35 Id.
I Id. See notes 58-60 inf ra and accompanying text.
7 Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1977).
3 8 Id.
39 Id. at 1146.
See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
4'Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (1st Cir. 1977).
4 ld. at 1147.
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subject to whatever duty is imposed by these regulations in the
same manner in which any citizen would be."' Second, the nature
of the role of air traffic controllers involves duties to air traffic
regardless of the procedures outlined in the FAA manual:" "[O]nce
the government took control of the air towers it became subject to
the duties that would devolve on any entity that took on such
responsibility."' The court stated that no comparable duty existed
for the FAA inspector.' Third, "[t]he relationship between pilots
and passengers and air controllers is imbued with reliance, a
foundation stone of tort liability.'"" The court said there was no
evidence that any person relied on the FAA to inspect the charter
aircraft.'
Thus the question of governmental liability for negligent inspec-
tion and certification of aircraft was unsettled after Clemente."
Rapp,"0 Arney,"1 and the air traffic controller cases"2 indicated that
the government would be held to a duty of due care in inspecting
and certifying aircraft." Clemente," which was brought under the
FTCA but which did not deal with the issues of inspection and
certification of aircraft, indicated that the good samaritan doc-
trine5 should be considered when determining the existence of
an actionable duty of due care under FAA regulationY
43Id.
'Id.
" Id. at 1147-48.
47"d. at 1148.
48Id.
I Note, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for Negli-
gent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 249 (1979).
5
°Rapp v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by
agreement, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970). See notes 17, 18 & 22 supra and
accompanying text.
51 Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973). See notes 19-22
supra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text.
I Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1976), motion for
reconsideration denied, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir.
1977).
" See notes 57-61 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 28-48 supra and accompanying text.
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THE GOOD SAMARITAN DOCTRINE AND
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The good samaritan doctrine protects a rescuer from the im-
position of liability unless his undertaking somehow worsens the
position of the endangered person.17 The doctrine is set forth in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Sections 323 and 324A."
Under Section 323, one who undertakes to render services to an-
other person is liable to him for negligence if the rescuer's failure
to use reasonable care either increases the risk of harm to the other
person or if the harm to the other person is suffered because of
the other person's reliance on the undertaking."9 Section 324A
states that one is liable to third persons for negligently rendering
services to another which he recognizes are necessary to protect
the third person, if his failure to use reasonable care increases the
risk of harm, or if he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by
another to the third person, or if the harm results from the reli-
ance of the other person or the third person on the undertaking."
" United States v. Devine, 306 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 343-48 (4th ed. 1971); 35 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Tort
Claims Act S 84 (1967).
"sRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 323 & 324A (1965).
5 9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) states:
NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING TO RENDER SERVICES:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability
to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.
"
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) reads:
LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF
UNDERTAKING:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
care to protect his undertaking if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.
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Most states have adopted the Restatement definition. '
The good samaritan doctrine was first applied under the FTCA
in Indian Towing Co. v. United States."2 In that case, decided in
1955, the Supreme Court held that the United States government
could be liable under the FTCA for the negligent operation of a
lighthouse which resulted in a barge running aground. 3 The Court
noted that the language of that part of the FTCA" which imposes
liability on the federal government in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, "is
not to be read as excluding liability for negligent conduct in the
operation of an enterprise in which private persons are not en-
gaged." Under the Court's rationale, the Coast Guard was obli-
gated to exercise due care in maintaining the lighthouse in good
working order once it had exercised its discretion and had decided
to operate the lighthouse." If the light went out, the Coast Guard
had a duty of due care to discover that condition and to repair
the light or to warn that it was broken."" The Court admonished
that "[i]t is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn
the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform
his 'good samaritan' task in a careful manner."' The good samari-
tan doctrine was subsequently applied to a number of air traffic
controller cases."
61 Significant Developments, Government Liability for Negligent OSHA In-
spections Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 59 B.U.L. REV. 546, 564 (1975).
See, e.g., Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1977) (Puerto
Rico looks to SS 323 and 324A); Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 551, 503 P.2d 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972) (California applies S 323);
Colonial Savings Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1976) (Texas applies pro-
visions of good samaritan doctrine as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS 324A (1965)). But see Mosely v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 671, 675
(E.D. Tenn. 1978) (Tennessee has not adopted good samaritan doctrine).
62350 U.S. 61 (1955).
63 Id. at 69.
6See note 5 supra.
65 350 U.S. at 64.
" Id. at 69.
67 Id.
9 1d. at 64-65.
69 See, e.g., Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 n.9 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that controller's warning about weather was sufficient to meet
duty to warn); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 1974)
(failure of FAA controller to warn pilot of small aircraft of close proximity to
wake turbulence from jet was negligence for which government could be held
1981]
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In 1977, the doctrine was applied in Blessing v. United States,"'
a case dealing with negligent government inspection. There, in-
jured employees sued the federal government under the FTCA,
basing their cause of action on the allegedly negligent inspection
of their private employers' premises by Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) inspectors.' The district court
found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege either the increased
risk or harm, or the reliance required by the causation elements
of the good samaritan doctrine." Accepting the government's argu-
ment, the court held that the plaintiffs could not base their claims
on breaches of duty arising solely out of federal law if there was
no corresponding duty under state tort law."2
United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States-
THE COURT'S REASONING
In United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the district court's finding that
the FAA regulations in question could serve as the basis of lia-
bility.4 The government had argued that the statement in Arney
v. United States"2 that "the government may be held liable for
negligence in improper issuance of a type airworthiness certificate"'"
was only dicta.77 The Court of Appeals did not accept this con-
tention;" however, it noted that Arney should not be read to mean
that a duty of due care would necessarily arise directly from FAA
regulations.' The court explained that in Arney it had been re-
viewing a summary judgment and that it therefore had not had
the opportunity to elaborate on the elements required for a cause
liable); Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970) (government
could be held liable for supplying inexact and incomplete weather information
to pilots).
70447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
71 Id. at 1164.
721Id. at 1160-61.
7 1d. at 1186 n.37.
71 United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 191 (9th Cir. 1979).
72 Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).
71 Id. at 658.
" United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 191 (9th Cir. 1979).
78 Id.
" Id.
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of action to arise from the negligent issuance of a type airworthi-
ness certificate.' Furthermore, the court recognized that Arney
had been brought pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court and thus could not be considered to control the FTCA
claim in United Scottish Insurance.81
The Court of Appeals stressed that the good samaritan doctrine
is applicable to the federal government under the FTCA.8 The
court rejected the government's argument that because the activity
in question was a safety inspection/certification there was no ana-
logous private person liability and thus no liability under the
FTCA." However, it refused to hold that because inspection and
certification is a uniquely governmental function, liability would
not arise from misfeasance." Recognizing the nature of the inspec-
tion/certification activity, the court concluded that these endeavors
warranted an analysis of the applicable regulations based upon
something other than an automatic application of state negligence
per se law.' The court found that analyzing the federal regulations
differently from an automatic application of negligence per se law
is "the only approach that is consistent with the Federal Tort
Claims Act which dictates that the government '[s]hall be liable
... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances.' ....
The Ninth Circuit bolstered its holding by looking to decisions
from other jurisdictions which dealt with the extent of govern-
80 Id.
81 Id. at 191-92. In deciding Arney, the Ninth Circuit relied on Rapp v. Eastern
Airlines, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Subsequent to the decision in Arney,
the Third Circuit announced that it had vacated by the agreement of the parties
the district court's decision in Rapp before Arney was decided. The Ninth Circuit
stated: "[Tlhat Rapp is no longer case authority in no way undermines the pro-
cedural value of Arney in this circuit." Id. at 191. Arney was a non-binding
decision, and the court will rely on non-binding decisions only when it believes
their reasoning provides some support for what it concludes is the correct
analysis. Id. The court also declined to reconsider and overrule Arney because
three-judge panels will abide by a prior decision until the United States Supreme
Court or a Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, overrules it, either implicitly
or explicitly. Id.




Id. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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mental liability pursuant to the FTCA when the government under-
takes good samaritan activities such as inspection and certification.
Finding the "best approach""7 in the majority opinion in Blessing
v. United States,8 the court noted that the FTCA was not designed
to redress breaches of federal statutory duty.8" After examining the
authority behind Blessing," the Court of Appeals concluded that
the purpose of the FTCA is to permit recovery for common law
torts." Since failure to inspect another's vehicle or machinery or
failure to inspect them with due care is not a common law tort,
the court reasoned that liability could not accrue under the FTCA
unless the applicable state good samaritan doctrine would recog-
nize the action if the United States were a private person.8
Public policy considerations played a role in the court's decision
that a federal statutory duty does not give rise to a duty of due
care under a state's negligence per se doctrine."3 The Ninth Circuit
noted that government conduct includes activities which are also
performed by private persons and corporations, such as driving
delivery vehicles."4 Although there is no primary duty to provide
the service, activities such as the inspection of aircraft are good
samaritan functions carried out pursuant to regulations."5 "[N]ot
only would there be no potential liability if government declined
to provide such service at all, but the government does not pur-
port to relieve other actions of the primary duty to see that the
underlying activity is accomplished safely or consistent with public
policy."" The court expressed concern that automatic liability might
cause governmental reluctance to undertake such inspections in the
future.'
Having established that liability under the FTCA for govern-
87 United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 183, 192 (9th Cir. 1979).
89 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
"United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 183, 192 (9th Cir. 1979).
"0Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See notes
70-73 supra and accompanying text.
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mental negligence in the inspection and certification of aircraft
would be predicated on the applicable state good samaritan doc-
trine, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to delineate the two general
approaches to the doctrine." One view taken by the courts has
been that the requirements of the good samaritan doctrine are
prerequisites to finding any duty at all.9 The other approach has
held that the undertaking itself creates a duty, with the elements
required by the good samaritan doctrine being prerequisites for a
finding of proximate or legal causation. ' "° In a given jurisdiction,
state law will control which approach is applicable.' °'
The Court of Appeals found that the requirement that the ele-
ments of the good samaritan doctrine be demonstrated was sup-
ported by cases involving "analogous governmental activity.'10
Those cases held air traffic controllers liable for negligence, with
their conduct evaluated in terms of regulations and air traffic con-
trol manuals.'' However, the Ninth Circuit did not extend the
analogy to include liability for negligent inspection and certifica-
tion of aircraft." The court reiterated its opinion in Spaulding v.
United States' that "the duty resting upon the [air traffic control]
manuals arises because of expected pilot reliance, in the air con-
trol situation, on published explanations of controller functions."'0
Endorsing the distinction °'0 between FAA inspectors and air traffic
controllers.. developed by the First Circuit in Clemente v. United
States,'' the court concluded that "[t]his inherent and ongoing re-
liance by pilots upon controllers satisfies the good samaritan test,
91 Id. at 195.
Id. See, e.g., Clemente v. United States, 576 F.2d 1140, 1149 (1st Cir. 1977).
1O United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 195. See Blessing
v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1193, 1200 n.51 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'0' United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 195 (9th Cir.
1979).
102 Id. at 196.
1
0 3 See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
14 United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 197 (9th Cir.
1979).
10 Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972).
' United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 196 (9th Cir.
1979).
107 Id.
'os See notes 40-48 supra and accompanying text.
'° Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (1st Cir. 1977).
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and alone, distinguishes the air traffic controller cases from that
before us here.""...
Since the court held that the existence of governmental liability
would depend on the existence of liability of a private person in
similar circumstances under the applicable state law, the court
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.1 ' The court suggested that the dis-
trict judge determine which state's substantive law applies." After
the applicable state law is determined, the issue will be whether
the plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of the applicable law."'
"Should state law preclude liability against a private person who
undertakes an inspection on behalf of others, or if the court finds
that the government's activity here would not allow a finding that
a duty relationship had been created or a proximate cause require-
ment satisfied, the district judge must dismiss the action for failure
to state a claim pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act."....
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United Scottish
Insurance Co. v. United States"' squarely addresses the issue of
FAA negligence in the inspection and certification of aircraft."'
For the first time, a case explicitly holds that the FAA may not
be held liable for negligence in the inspection and certification
process ' unless the plaintiffs can prove that a private person would
have been held liable in similar circumstances under the applicable
state law."' Whether a private individual in similar circumstances
would be held liable for the negligent inspection and certification
'United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 197 (9th Cir.
1979).
"IId. at 198.
112 Id. See text accompanying note 122 infra.
113 Id.
"
4 Id. at 198-99.
" United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
"'Id. at 191.
17 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
11I United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 195 (9th Cir.
1979).
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of aircraft in turn depends on the applicable good samaritan
doctrine.'19
Before looking at the substantive law, courts first will have to
decide which state's law to apply.'" Conflicts of law problems can
become very complicated when a case involves the certification
and inspection of aircraft."' As in United Scottish Insurance Co.,
courts may face situations where the aircraft was built in one
state, it was modified and was issued supplemental type certificate
in another state, and it carried passengers from numerous states.'"
Because most states accept the Restatement definition of the good
samaritan doctrine, the question of which jurisdiction's law to apply
may be purely academic." ' However, at least one state does not
recognize the good samaritan doctrine," and it remains to be seen
how courts will interpret the Restatement's requirements of in-
creased harm and reliance.1
In fact, the real impact of this case will become clearer after
courts determine exactly what plaintiffs will have to prove to
demonstrate that the increased risk of harm or reliance prerequi-
sites of the good samaritan doctrine have been satisfied.'" It is un-
likely that many inspection/certification cases will arise where
the negligent conduct of the FAA actually increases the risk of
harm." Moreover, the Ninth Circuit implied that reliance on the
FAA inspections does not arise from the nature of the activity
itself." The court said that this case was distinguishable from air
traffic controller cases because reliance is inherent in the relation-
ship between pilots and air traffic controllers." Arguably, pas-
11 Id.
'20Id. at 198.
"20See, e.g., id. at 188-89.
12 Id.
'"See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
124 Mosely v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 671, 675 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (Ten-
nessee has not adopted good samaritan doctrine).
125 See notes 59 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
1"0 Id.
"2 See notes 59 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
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sengers do rely'" on the government to insure that the aircraft
they board are safe. If the courts require a more specific showing
of reliance, however, it is unlikely that plaintiffs can ever meet
such a burden. As one observer pointed out: "While the public
is no doubt aware that the aviation industry is highly regulated,
in all probability few persons who are the passengers of commercial
aviation have even heard of airworthiness certification, much less
rely on it before stepping into an airplane..'.'.
To the extent that the primary duty for air safety depends on
the carriers, the holding in United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United
States is a good decision. The Ninth Circuit made it clear that the
government will not be held liable for negligently inspecting and
certifying private property if that activity is the responsibility of
another party." However, if the reliance element of the good
samaritan doctrine presents a virtually insurmountable hurdle for
plaintiffs, little encouragement will be given to the FAA to upgrade
its inspection/ certification procedures.'
To the extent that consumers expect aircraft to be safe, regard-
less of whether they know the technical procedure for determining
airworthiness, the decision may fail to honor their expectations.
On the other hand, one might conclude that carriers and their
insurance companies now stand forewarned that they will be fully
responsible for airworthiness and that they will therefore take
greater precautions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has cre-
ated a framework for imposing governmental liability under the
FTCA for the negligent inspection and certification of aircraft,"'
"
0 See notes 59 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
"' Note, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for
Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 272 (1979).
13"United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 193 (9th Cir.
1979).
"See generally TIME, July 7, 1980, at 43, citing a study by a blue ribbon
panel of thirteen aviation experts headed by George M. Low, a high-ranking
NASA official and president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The report con-
cluded that the FAA is not capable of competently certifying new aircraft. About
370 of the FAA's engineering staff are involved with certifying aircraft, and
they cannot consider every detail. For example, Lockheed submitted 300,000
sketches and 2,000 reports in designing the L-1011. To deal with the barrage of
documents, the FAA turns to designated engineering representatives (DER's)
who are actually employed by aircraft manufacturers. Id.
"4United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 195 (9th Cir.
1979).
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but the framework will require development. In any event, given
the importance of this issue, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will eventually be forced to address the question of governmental
liability for the negligent inspection and certification of aircraft.
Julie Lanier Bloss
CIVIL PROCEDURE-PERSONAL JURISDICTION-
MERE FORESEEABILITY OF CONTACTS WITH A STATE IS NOT THE
TEST FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION; TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS A
NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT MUST HAVE SUCH CONTACTS WITH A
STATE THAT HE IS ON CLEAR NOTICE THAT HE Is THERE SUB-
JECT TO SUIT. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100
S. Ct. 559 (1980).
In 1976, Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi auto-
mobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway) in Massena, New
York. At the time of the purchase the Robinsons were New York
residents; however, they acquired the car to use for their move
to Arizona. On the way to Arizona, while in Oklahoma, the car
was struck from the rear by another automobile. The Audi ex-
ploded when the gas tank ruptured, thus causing injuries to the
occupants. Claiming that the gas tank had been defective, the
Robinsons brought a products liability suit in the District Court of
Creek County, Oklahoma, against, among other defendants, the
automobile's regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Cor-
poration (World-Wide),' and its retail dealer, Seaway.' World-
Wide and Seaway entered special appearances contending that
'World-Wide Volkswagen is incorporated and has its business office in the
State of New York. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559,
563 (1980). See text accompanying note 5 infra.
2Suit was also brought against the automobile's manufacturer and importer;
however, these defendants did not seek appellate review in the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma on the issue of the exercise of personal jurisdiction and were not
petitioners before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 562 n.3.
3A special appearance is an appearance before the court "for the purpose of
objecting by motion to the jurisdiction of the court, the venue of the action,
or an insufficiency of process or service of process." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 520 (1969). Failure to follow the proper
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Oklahoma's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.!
When this action was instituted, World-Wide was incorporated
in New York, and it distributed vehicles and vehicle parts, in the
three-state area of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.' Sea-
way had contractual relations with World-Wide, but it was other-
wise a totally independent corporation.' There was no evidence
that either Seaway or World-Wide did any business in Oklahoma,'
and the Respondent, during oral appellate argument, admitted
that with the single exception of the Robinsons' Audi, there was
no evidence of any other car sold by World-Wide or Seaway hav-
ing entered Oklahoma.8
The trial court ruled that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by Oklahoma over the two defendants under the Oklahoma long-
arm statute was proper. The defendants sought a writ of prohibi-
procedure may result in a waiver of the defense. Rule 12 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure abolished the distinction between special and general appear-
ances in the federal courts. However, in state courts which continue to utilize
special appearances, the defendant must object to defects in jurisdiction, venue
or service of process by special motion, as an answer to the merits of the com-
plaint is tantamount to an appearance for all purposes. Id. at 520-22.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I. The due process rationale is based upon the
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. As the Supreme Court said:
Since the adoption of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution the validity of . . . judgments may be directly questioned,
and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that
proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights
and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).




'OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1961). This section provides that:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief
arising from the person's ... causing tortious injury in this state by
an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits
business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state. . ..
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to confer personal
jurisdiction upon that State's courts to the limits permitted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America
Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank of New York Trust
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tion in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to restrain the trial court
from exercising in personam'° jurisdiction over them, but the writ
was denied." The Supreme Court of the United States then granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the decision of the Okla-
homa Supreme Court and the decisions of the highest courts of
several other states."2 Held, reversed and remanded: Mere fore-
seeability of contacts with a state is not the test for personal juris-
diction; to satisfy due process a nonresident defendant must have
such contacts with a state that he is on clear notice that he is there
subject to suit.
Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla.
1970).
"IJn personam jurisdiction (personal jurisdiction) was based upon physical
power. A court did not have the power to adjudicate a matter involving a de-
fendant unless he was served with process while he was physically present
within the sovereign's territory. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 206-07 (1969). A judgment by a court having in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant rendered that party personally liable for the judg-
ment. Eventually the requirement that service of process be accomplished while
the defendant was in the forum state was relaxed, and the determination of the
validity of a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction rested upon minimum con-
tacts between the state, the defendant and the litigation. See text accompanying
notes 16-22 infra. In rem jurisdiction also relied upon the territorial power of
the sovereign; the res was required to be within the borders of the state:
The essential function of an action in rem is the determination of
title to or the status of property located within the court's juris-
diction. Conceptually, in rem jurisdiction operates directly on the
property that the court's judgment is effective against all persons
who have an interest in the property .... A quasi in rem action is
basically what the name implies-a halfway house between in rem
and in personam jurisdiction. The action is not really against the
property; rather it involves the assertion of a personal claim of the
type usually advanced in an action in personam and the demand
ordinarily is for a money judgment, although in some contexts
the objective may be to determine rights in certain property. The
basis for transforming the suit from one in personam to an action
against defendant's property is the attachment or garnishment of
some or all of the property he may have in the jurisdiction. If
plaintiff eventually secures a judgment in a quasi in rem action, it
will be satisfied to the extent possible out of the attached property.
Id. at 268. The usual criticism of quasi in rem jurisdiction is that it is used solely
as a device to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Id. at 283.
"World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla.
1978).
- 440 U.S. 907 (1979). See Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court,
177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972); Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp.,
200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704
(Utah 1974); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647
(1967).
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I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION-Pennoyer TO Kulko
The limits, complexion and foundation of personal jurisdiction
have undergone immense change in recent history. The early land-
mark case in this area of the law, Pennoyer v. Nefl,' 3 solidified the
mechanical "territorial power"' theory of jurisdiction. According
to this theory, a court had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident,
nonconsenting defendant only if he was personally served while
physically present within the borders of the forum state. 5
The foundation of modern jurisdictional theory is International
Shoe Co. v. Washington."E In that case the State of Washington
brought suit in one of its courts to collect state unemployment
insurance contributions from International Shoe, a Missouri-based
Delaware corporation which had no offices and which made no
contracts in Washington, but which did employ eleven to thirteen
salesmen who lived in Washington. Those employees were super-
vised and compensated from the St. Louis office of the company."
195 U.S. 714 (1877). For a more detailed analysis of the history of per-
sonal jurisdiction, see Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,
165 Sup. Or. REV. 241 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hazard]; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law--State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1960).
4 Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End To Ambivalence In Jurisdiction Theory?
26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Casad].
" Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 727. Although Justice Field called this theory
"a principle of general, if not universal, law," he foreshadowed its eventual
demise in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion:
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits,
or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or repre-
sentative in the State to receive service of process and notice in
legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, associ-
ation or contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be
made and notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make
such appointment or designate such place that service may be made
upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or in some other
prescribed way, and that judgments rendered upon such service may
not be binding upon the non-resident both within and without the
State.
Id. at 735.
'6326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"Upon those facts, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's assertion
of jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation. The Court stated: "It is evident
that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the
forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
The Supreme Court in International Shoe abandoned the fictions
of "presence"'8 and "consent"1" which had been employed to con-
form to the territorial power theory. Instead, the Court established
new constitutional guidelines against which future exercises of
personal jurisdiction by courts would be measured:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts within it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.""
Since the defendant had conducted activities in the state, a natural
obligation of the defendant to defend suits connected with such
activities arose from the exercise of that privilege."' Under this
test, one act alone could be sufficient to render the defendant liable
to suit; however, "whether due process is satisfied must depend...
upon the quality and nature of the activity ... ." The result of
International Shoe was a shift from an emphasis on territoriality
to an emphasis on minimum contacts and fairness." The full im-
pact, though, of this new standard had to await future decisions."
The first major Supreme Court decision which gave insight into
the meaning of International Shoe was McGee v. International Life
fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which appellant has incurred there." Id. at 320.
18 For an illustration of the use of the doctrine of "presence," see Philadelphia
& Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
"1 For an illustration of the use of the doctrine of "consent," see Hess v.
Pawolski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
1t International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
2 Id.
2 Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary
Process, 54 NoTRE DAME LAw. 587, 593 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as Nor-
denberg].
'As one legal scholar stated in commenting on the International Shoe deci-
sion: "[S]implicity, predictability and ease of application .. .were sacrificed,
perhaps as a matter of necessity .... Whatever may be their merits as constitu-
tional standards, tests such as 'fairness,' 'justice' and 'reasonableness' undeniably
create a measure of uncertainty in terms of their future application." Id. at 595.
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Ins. Co."' There the only contact by the nonresident defendant
insurance company with the California plaintiff was an offer by
mail to reinsure the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of an
existing policy which had been issued by the defendant's prede-
cessor. The Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal juris-
diction by the California court was proper even though the non-
resident defendant's sole contact with the forum state was the offer
to reinsure the plaintiff.' Justice Black,' writing for a unanimous
court, quoted the "minimum contacts" language of International
Shoe;"* however, this was not the basis of his opinion. First, Justice
Black concluded that the defendant no longer needed the protection
once afforded him in a jurisdictional inquiry. Black stated:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state juris-
diction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part
this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our na-
tional economy over the years. Today many commercial trans-
actions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated
by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of com-
merce has come a great increase in the amount of business con-
ducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern trans-
portation and communication have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.29
Second, Black stressed the strong state interest California had in
2- 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The International Life Insurance Company assumed
the obligations of an Arizona corporation which had issued a life insurance
policy to a California resident in 1944. In 1948, International Life mailed a
letter to the California resident offering to insure him in accordance with the
terms of the original policy. He accepted and continued to pay premiums. After
his death his beneficiary was denied recovery on the policy because of a claim of
suicide. Neither the original insurance company nor International Life had an
office or an agent in California. International Life's only contact with California
was the insurance contract. Despite this, the California courts held that there
were sufficient contacts so that the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident
corporation was within the limits of due process. The courts of Texas disagreed,
and refused to give the California judgment full faith and credit. Id.
Id. at 221-24.
'r Justice Black had dissented in International Shoe. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. at 322-26. Black felt the Court was formulating broad
rules concerning the exercise of personal jurisdiction before there was a need to
address such a constitutional issue. Id. at 322.
" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 222.
29 Id. at 222-23.
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providing its citizens with a convenient forum,' an interest which
was manifested by a special jurisdictional statute.31 Essentially, the
Court took a forum-biased analysis of contacts rather than the
traditional defendant-biased analysis.'
Any appearance of clarity as a result of McGee was short-lived.
Only one year later, during the same term in which McGee had
been decided, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hanson v.
Denckla.' In that case a Florida court attempted to exercise juris-
diction over the assets of a Delaware trust and the Delaware trust
company trustee which had arranged the trust while the settlor
was a resident of Pennsylvania.' The Court attempted to dis-
tinguish McGee by pointing out that the Florida legislature had
not evidenced an interest in this type of litigation through enact-
30 Justice Black stated:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in pro-
viding effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvan-
tage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a
distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
Id. at 223.
31Id. at 224. In support of a State's strong interest in providing a forum for
its residents, Justice Black cited Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623 (1935) and Hess v. Pawolsky, 279 U.S. 352 (1927). In Doherty the
Court emphasized that Iowa had demonstrated an interest in corporate securities
by specially regulating such securities. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
294 U.S. at 627. In Hess, Massachusetts had enacted a special long arm
statute to enable its citizens to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants involved in automobile accidents within its borders. Hess v. Pawolski,
274 U.S. at 354. The Court reasoned that the long arm statute forced the de-
fendant to answer for his conduct in the State where the accident occurred and
also provided a convenient forum for the plaintiff to enforce his rights. Id.
at 356.
2 355 U.S. at 223-24. Justice Brennan explained in his dissent in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), that the defendant-biased
analysis of personal jurisdiction gave the defendant a "veto power over certain
very appropriate fora-a power the defendant justifiably enjoyed long ago when
communication and travel over long distances was slow and unpredictable and
when notions of state sovereignty were impractical and exaggerated." Id. at 587.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 239. Mrs. Donner had established a trust while she was a domiciliary
of Pennsylvania. She later moved to Florida where she exercised her power of
appointment over the assets of the trust. The Florida courts contended that they
possessed jurisdiction over both the assets of the trust and the trustee, a foreign
corporation whose sole contacts with Florida were its relations and communica-
tions with Mrs. Donner. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida
Supreme Court and held that Florida did not have jurisdiction over the assets of
the trustee. Id.
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ment of special jurisdictional statutes.3 Although the trend had
been to expand jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that restrictions
on the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts still existed and that
these restrictions were a direct result of the:
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. How-
ever minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a de-
fendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimum contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him.'
Thus, the Court with a bare majority" returned to a defendant-
biased analysis of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, as an added
requirement to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction the
Court stated that "it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws."3 (emphasis added). With
"Id. at 253. Many courts have perceived an inconsistency in the Supreme
Court's reasoning resulting in a split of authority. Compare Hydraulics Unlimited
Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo. 1971) (relying on Hanson
and stating that McGee had been narrowed by Hanson); White v. Goldthwaite,
204 Kan. 83, 460 P.2d 578 (1969) (stressing the unilateral aspect of Hanson in
an attempt to distinguish McGee); Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod-
ucts, Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963) (suggesting that Hanson
limited McGee), with In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d
220 (6th Cir. 1972) (avoiding a literal interpretation of Hanson by stating that its
"purposefully avails" language means that a person is not to be subject to suit
if the only contact with the forum has been the unilateral activity of the plaintiff);
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting the dichotomy
between McGee and Hanson); and Phillips v. Archer Hocking Glass Corp., 100
Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (refusing to apply the Hanson language literally).
Some scholars have suggested that the restrictive language of the majority in
Hanson was a natural reaction to the broad wording of McGee. The Court may
have felt that it needed to curb the expansive philosophy embodied in McGee,
and thus drafted its opinion with that goal in mind. See, e.g., Nordenberg, supra
note 23, at 615. Some courts followed this trend and limited the holding in
McGee to its specific factual situation, particularly because California had
demonstrated a special interest in the insurance industry. See, e.g., Iowa Electric
Light Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir. 1979). For
criticism of the Hanson decision, see Hazard, supra note 4; Reese & Galston,
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44
IowA L. REV. 249 (1959).
"e Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251.
3TThe 5-4 decision of Hanson caused some courts to ignore the suggestion of
more stringent standards in determining personal jurisdiction. Nordenberg, supra
note 23, at 616.
38 Hanson v. Daniels, 357 U.S. at 253.
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this statement the Court introduced a subjective element into
jurisdictional analysis.'
Although McGee and Hanson were decided within one year of
each other, nearly twenty years passed before the Supreme Court
again directed its attention to the problem of personal jurisdiction.
During the interim, the issue of personal jurisdiction was left to
the state courts."0 This led to a variety of results. Some courts read
Hanson's "purposefully avails" language literally,"' believing that
it required what has been called the "civil equivalent of mens rea."'
Other courts refused to read the decision literally.' Indeed, the
highest court of one state suggested that to read the "purposefully
avails" language literally, particularly in negligence and products
liability suits where the actors rarely consider the laws of the
foreign state, would be to return to the "implied consent" doctrine."
Some decisions quoted the Hanson language and then expanded
jurisdiction by means of some other test, such as foreseeability. '
Finally, a few courts attempted to reconcile International Shoe,
McGee, and Hanson through a type of balancing test."
'9 Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction after Shafler and Kulko
and a Modern Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
20 Asuz. L. REV. 861, 885 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods].
"Id. at 868.
4 1 See, e.g., Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996
(D. Colo. 1971); White v. Goldthwaite, 204 Kan. 83, 460 P.2d 578 (1969); Tyee
Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
1 Woods, supra note 39, at 869. Some courts take such a literal view of the
"purposefully avails" standard that they require that a defendant have the sub-
jective intent to place himself under a given court's jurisdiction before they will
rule that he is amenable to process. Id. at 885.
4
'See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1972); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963);
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
See also Forster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV.
9 (1969).
"See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 254, 413
P.2d 732, 735 (1966).
* See, e.g., Products Promotions, Inc. v Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th
Cir. 1974), where the court stated: "The operative consideration is that the de-
fendant's contacts with the forum were deliberate, rather than fortuitous, so that
the possible need to invoke the benefits and protections of the forum's laws was
reasonably foreseeable, if not foreseen, rather than a surprise." See also Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 900, 458
P.2d 57, 63, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1960) (result of test was "not fortuitous or
.unforeseeable").
'See, e.g., L. D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d
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In 1977, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction. In Shafler v. Heitner," a nonresident of Dela-
ware brought a shareholder's derivative suit in a Delaware state
court against Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, Greyhound
Lines, Inc., its subsidiary incorporated in California with its prin-
cipal place of business in Arizona, and against twenty-eight pres-
ent or former corporate officers or directors."8 The plaintiff seques-
tered property owned by twenty-one of the twenty-eight defendants.
The property, which included stocks, options and warrants, was
used as the basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction."9 The Court declared
this exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction unconstitutional and stated
that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.'"" Employing a minimum contacts analysis,"1 the Court
768 (9th Cir. 1959), quoting 47 GEORGETOWN L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958):
There are three rules which can be drawn from combined reading
of International Shoe, McGee and Hanson against which all future
litigation of a like nature may be tested .... The rules are:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate
some transaction within the forum. It is not necessary that defend-
ant's agent be physically within the forum, for this act or transaction
may be by mail only. A single event will suffice if its effects within
the state are substantial enough to qualify under Rule Three.
(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results
from, the activities of the defendant within the forum. It is con-
ceivable that the actual cause of action might come to fruition in
another state, but because of the activities of defendant in the
forum state there would still be a "substantial minimum contact."
(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum con-
tact between the defendant and the state, the assumption of juris-
diction based upon such contact must be consonant with the due
process tenets of "fair play" and "substantial justice." If this test
is fulfilled, there exists a "substantial minimum contact" between
the forum and the defendant. The reasonableness of subjecting the
defendant to jurisdiction under this rule is frequently tested by
standards analogous to those of forum non conveniens.
265 F.2d at 773 n.12.
47433 U.S. 186 (1979).
48 Id. at 189. The plaintiff claimed that a breach of duty by the defendants
had resulted in the imposition of liability against the corporation in an antitrust
suit and a criminal contempt action. Id. at 190.
11 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 191-92. For an explanation of quasi in rem,
in rem, and in personam jurisdiction, see note 10 supra.
o Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 212.
1 Id. at 212-16. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the
Court should never have reached the question of minimum contacts. The case
had been tried on a quasi in rem theory; the issue of minimum contacts was
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noted that the nonresident defendants did have some contacts with
Delaware simply by being officers of a Delaware corporation. The
plaintiff stressed Delaware's strong state interest in exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation's fiduciaries so that
it could supervise the management of the corporation and estab-
lish the duties owed to the corporation by its officers and directors."
However, the Court stated that Delaware had not evidenced this
state interest since it had not enacted a special long arm statute
asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident officers and direc-
tors of Delaware corporations." The Court concluded that there
were not sufficient minimum contacts to demonstrate that the de-
fendants had "'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State,' in a way that
would justify bringing them before a Delaware tribunal."' The
Court stated that the defendants "simply had nothing to do with
the State of Delaware"" and as a result "had no reason to expect
to be haled before a Delaware court. ' '" (emphasis added). Thus,
in its first opinion in twenty years addressing the issue of personal
jurisdiction, "' the Supreme Court reemphasized both the subjective
never pleaded, raised during discovery, or ruled upon by the Delaware courts.
As Brennan said: "In my view, a purer example of an advisory opinion is not
to be found." Id. at 220.
52 Id. at 214.
Id. The Court stated:
This argument is undercut by the failure of the Delaware Legislature
to assert the state interest appellee finds so compelling. Delaware
law bases jurisdiction, not on appellants' status as corporate fidu-
ciaries, but rather on the presence of their property in the State.
Although the sequestration procedure used here may be most fre-
quently used in derivative suits against officers and directors ...
the authorizing statute evinces no specific concern with such actions.
Id. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (exercise
of jurisdiction upheld on basis of California's strong state interest in providing a
forum for its residents in suits against nonresident insurance companies-such
interest evidenced by a special jurisdictional statute). See also note 68 and accom-
panying text infra, concerning the Supreme Court's emphasis placed on the lack
of a special jurisdictional statute in Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436
U.S. 84 (1978).
4 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216.
55 Id.
id.
5 Casad, supra note 14, at 69.
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element of personal jurisdiction and the preference in jurisdic-
tional analysis favoring defendants."
After Shafler, courts scrutinized more closely the propriety of
personal jurisdiction and often mentioned Shaffer's reaffirmance
of Hanson's "purposefully avails" standard.' One court went so
far as to call the trend the Supreme Court's "new caution. '"' An-
other court commented that the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer
"suggested that the liberal construction placed on the words 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play' in a due process context may be evolv-
ing into a more conservative one, requiring, perhaps, even more
contacts than those present in McGee.'"
The conservative trend restricting the expansion of personal
jurisdiction was continued in Kulko v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia.' There, a California resident brought suit against her former
husband, a New York resident, seeking custody of their two chil-
dren and increased child support. The defendant father had allow-
ed the children to live with their mother during school months
and to return to New York for vacations.' The father had paid
"See generally Woods, supra note 39, at 885-88. See also note 39 supra and
accompanying text.
"'See Nordenberg, supra note 23, at 618. The reaction to Shajffer took three
forms: (1) Long-arm statutes authorizing in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
were reexamined. See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1978); (2) Courts questioned the type of jurisdiction deemed
proper in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966). See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). In Seider v. Roth, jurisdiction over the
defendant was obtained by the court's attaching the defendant's policy of
liability insurance which had been issued by an insurer subject to in personam
jurisdiction in the forum where the plaintiff brought the action. The question of
the validity of such quasi in rem jurisdiction was finally answered in Rush v.
Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980). The Court in this companion case to World-
Wide Volkswagen held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction should not be
permitted where the insurance contract is the only contract. Id. at 579-80. Courts
evaluated the effect of Shafler on in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., Securities
& Exchange Comm'n v. Gilbert, 82 F.R.D. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pavlo v.
James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Smith v. Lloyd's of
London, 568 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1978).
"See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Gilbert, 82 F.R.D. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"Smith v. Lloyds of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1118 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978).
-436 U.S. 84 (1978).
"Id. at 88. This was the reverse of the terms of the original divorce agree-
ment. Id.
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
to have one child flown to California while the mother had paid
the plane fare of the other. The Court, finding that the father had
not purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of
the laws of California, reasoned that in such a family situation,
a parent "could [not] reasonably have anticipated being 'haled
before a [California] court' ' simply by sending one of his chil-
dren to live with his or her mother." The plaintiff argued that Cali-
fornia had "substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its
minor residents and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a
healthy and supportive family environment in which the children
of the State are to be raised." 7 While the Court agreed that these
were important interests, it noted that, unlike the situation in
McGee, "California [had] not attempted to assert any particular-
ized interest in trying such cases in its courts by, e.g., enacting a
special jurisdictional statute."'
The cases following Kulko showed that many courts sensed the
continuation of the Supreme Court's conservative trend which was
begun in Shaffer." For example, in Colorado River Water Conser-
vation District v. Andrews,m a defendant had dumped certain preda-
tory fish into the Colorado River in Utah. According to the plaintiff,
the fish eventually depleted the stock of an endangered species of
fish. The plaintiff attempted to establish jurisdiction in Colorado
by claiming that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts
with Colorado since the fish had caused damage in that state. The
District Court disagreed with the plaintiff's assertions on the
ground that the defendants were not shown to have purposefully
Id. at 97-98.
I61d. The Court reasoned that a strain would be placed on family relations
if jurisdiction were found to exist in this situation. Obviously, the domestic rela-
tions nature of this case weighed heavily on the Court's mind. Id.
67 Id. at 98.
"Id. It should be noted that California's general long arm statute is a grasp-
ing long arm statute in that it reaches to the full limits of the Constitution. "A
court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN.
410.10 (West 1973).
"
9 See, e.g., Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Feldman, 480 F. Supp.
1307, 1313 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
70476 F. Supp. 966 (D. Clo. 1979).
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availed themselves of the benefits and privileges of Colorado's
laws.'1
A major problem facing courts as a result of the Hanson-
Shaffer-Kulko line of decisions was the subjective element intro-
duced into personal jurisdiction by both the "purposefully avails"
language of Hanson and the "reason to expect to be haled into
court" language of Shaffer and Kulko.7 ' Indeed, many courts con-
tinued to use an objective foreseeability test in place of the "pur-
posefully avails" requirement."3 Particularly in the field of products
liability the "purposefully avails" language had come under severe
attack." As one court reasoned, if a corporation introduced its
products into the stream of commerce and those products event-
ually injured a person in a state where it had reason to know the
products would be brought, then that corporation should be sub-
ject to jurisdiction where the injury occurred.7'
One of the first cases to substitute a foreseeabiity test for the
"purposefully avails" test was Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles." In that case a worker in California was in-
"' Id. at 969. Although some courts had questioned the validity of a liberal
application of the language of Hanson, the district court felt that the language was
still important, particularly in light of its reemphasis in Shaffer and Kulko.
Although the defendant did have some contacts with Colorado which had caused
effects in that state, the court refused to assert jurisdiction. As the district judge
stated: "In Kulko, the Court indicated that it may be unreasonable in certain
cases to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who causes 'effects' in a State by acts
done elsewhere." Id. at 970.
" See generally Woods, supra note 39, at 885-90.
7' See, e.g., Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1979). In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Stephenson summarized the feelings of many judges concerning the Hanson
language: "[If a foreseeability test for 'purposefully avails itself' were [sic] not
applied in products liability cases, an injured person would almost always be left
with no direct recourse against the manufacturer of the product causing his in-
jury." Id. at 838; Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
99 St. Ct. 2710 (1979); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Appartewerke, 509 F.2d 1137
(7th Cir. 1975); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969);
Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113, 458 P.2d 57 (1969).
74 See notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text supra. For a general discussion
of personal jurisdiction over manufacturers and sellers in products liability cases,
see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968).
r' Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d at 596.
'71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
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jured by the explosion of a pressure tank manufactured by the
Buckeye Boiler Company, an Ohio corporation." There was no
evidence concerning how the tank entered California; however, the
plaintiff did show that Buckeye Boiler had carried on regular sales
with Cochin, a California dealer, for sales of tanks of another
type.' The California Supreme Court concluded: "If the manu-
facturer sells its products in circumstances such that it knows or
should reasonably anticipate that they will ultimately be resold
in a particular state, it should be held to have purposefully availed
itself of the market for its products in that state.""m The court held
that since Buckeye Boiler had not alleged that the tank had
arrived in California fortuitously or that the burden of defending
the present action in California would be substantially different
from the burden of defending actions which might arise from its
sales to Cochin, the exercise of jurisdiction was proper." In the
same vein, other courts extended the use of foreseeability by noting
that certain products, such as automobiles8 and rides for travelling
fairs,82 are by their very nature mobile. Therefore, the courts
reasoned, their manufacturers and distributors should foresee
the possibility of defending suits in foreign tribunals. Even so,
the use of this foreseeability test continued to generate consider-
able debate," especially in light of the fact that the test was cap-
" Id. at 896, 458 P.2d at 60, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
Id. at 897, 458 P.2d at 61, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
I d. at 900, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
8 Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
81 See, e.g., Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J.
1974). A Wisconsin Pontiac dealer sold an automobile containing a defective jack
to the plaintiff, who was injured while changing a tire in New Jersey. General
Motors, a Michigan corporation, had manufactured the auto and had equipped
the car with the defective jack. The Federal District Court in New Jersey ruled
that it possessed jurisdiction over both the manufacturer and the dealer. But cf.
Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956)
(the famous hypothetical of a California dealer selling tires for an auto which
has Pennsylvania license plates, with the possible result that the California dealer
might have to travel to Pennsylvania to defend a suit connected with such tires).
82 Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d at 593-96.
" See note 81 supra.
"Judges on the same court have disagreed over the propriety and valid appli-
cation of the foreseeability test. See, e.g., Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 P.2d
823 (8th Cir. 1978) where Justice Stephenson wrote a strong dissent to the
majority's refusal to apply the foresecability test. Decisions from the same circuit
also have yielded conflicting viewpoints concerning the use of the test. Compare
1981]
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able of causing extreme results."
II. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen was faced with
an assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Oklahoma state court
over a New York automobile dealer and a distributor which sold
cars in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. This assertion
was made despite the fact that the only contacts between the de-
fendants and Oklahoma were the presence of their car and the
possibility of some relations with Oklahoma Audi dealers. The
plaintiff argued that the presence of the defective car in Oklahoma,
the defendants' relations with Oklahoma Audi dealers, and the
movable nature of an automobile," making it foreseeable that the
defendant might have to defend against suits in foreign tribunals,
combined to provide a sufficient connection with the forum to
satisfy due process requirements." The Supreme Court, however,
held that the relations between the Oklahoma Audi dealers and
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Appartewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1976) (appar-
ently relying on foreseeability to uphold jurisdiction), with McBreen v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1976) (denying that Honeywell relied
on foreseeability).
'See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). Great Western, a Texas corporation, was notified that it
would have to comply with the takeover laws of Idaho, New York and Maryland,
as well as those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, if it decided to
acquire the stock of another company. To escape the conflicting requirements
of these regulations, Great Western brought suit in Texas against the state
officials responsible for enforcing the Idaho, New York and Maryland laws.
Idaho questioned the validity of the Court's assertion of personal jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction:
When the Idaho officials summarily delayed the effectiveness of
Great Western's tender offer for Sunshine, they foreseeably re-
strained a corporation in Dallas from proceeding with its plans.
In other words, the Idaho officials regulated a corporation that acts
in the Northern District of Texas and through that regulation fore-
seeably changed the corporation's actions. These effects--effects with
substantial consequences on important business plans-are more
than sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.
id. at 1267.
"World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 566. This theory
was argued successfully in Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205
(D.N.J. 1974), discussed in note 75 supra.
"World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 566, 568.
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the defendants were not the type that would support jurisdiction.""
Moreover, the Court declared that " 'foreseeability' alone has never
been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause.""
In Part II of the decision the Court articulated the guidelines
for the due process limits of personal jurisdiction. The Court re-
emphasized the preference in favor of defendants in jurisdictional
analysis. The Court stated: "As has long been settled, and as we
reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exists 'mini-
mum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State." The
Court explained that the concept of minimum contacts performed
two functions: (1) ensuring the co-equal sovereignty of each
State and (2) ensuring fairness by protecting the defendant from
having to litigate in inconvenient forums.' While the Court con-
firmed the bias toward defendants in personal jurisdictional an-
alysis, it recognized in examining the fairness prong of minimum
contacts that:
the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will
in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant fac-
tors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute [citing McGee]; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief; . . . the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive policies."
Moreover, the Court recognized the expansion of personal juris-
diction as articulated in McGee;"3 however, it then stressed federal-
ism and the importance of state boundaries ' in language remi-






" Id. Justice White, writing for the majority, used vehement terms to express
his opinion of the importance of federalism:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law
19811
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niscent of Pennoyer v. Nefi."
With this mixture of jurisdictional guideposts the Court in Part
M analyzed the foreseeability aspect of personal jurisdiction urged
by the plaintiff. The Court concluded that if foreseeability was
the appropriate test for invoking personal jurisdiction then juris-
diction should have existed in both Hanson and Kulko since the
defendants in those cases could have foreseen the contacts with
the forums." The Court speculated that the foreseeability test,
if left unhindered, eventually would cause every seller of chattels
to "appoint the chattel his agent for service of process."9
Therefore, instead of accepting the objective test proposed by
the plaintiff, the Court focused on the subjective awareness of the
defendant. The Court stated: "[I]t is not the mere likelihood that
a product will find its way into the forum State [which is critical
to due process analysis]. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."" The defend-
ant, the Court commented, is not deemed to have purposefully
availed itself of the privileges and benefits of a state unless "it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there."" (emphasis added). The
to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instru-
ment of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment.
id. at 565-66.
"See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722.
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 566. In analyz-
ing Hanson, Professor Woods felt that although it was foreseeable that Mrs.
Donner might travel to Florida, it was not foreseeable that a Delaware trustee
would find itself litigating matters concerning a Delaware trust under Florida
law. Woods, supra note 39, at 898.
"'World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 566. The Court
concluded that should a chattel be deemed the seller's agent for service of process,
a situation analogous to that of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), would result.
The basic premise of Harris v. Balk was that a debt followed the debtor. A
citizen of North Carolina owed money to another citizen of that state. While in
M;iryland, the North Carolina debtor was sued by a creditor of the North
Carolina creditor. The Maryland creditor obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over
the nonresident North Carolinian because he owed money to the creditor's non-
resident debtor and had travelled to the forum state. Id. This type of jurisdiction
was later found unconstitutional. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
"World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
"Id. (emphasis added). The "notice" language is similar to that used by
Professor Woods; however, Woods' notice requirement was objective rather than
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Court, shifting from subjective awareness to subjective intent, con-
cluded that if a corporation desired to avoid being subject to juris-
diction in a particular forum, it could consciously sever its relations
with that State and thereby become immune from jurisdiction. ' To
hold a manufacturer or a distributor of an allegedly defective prod-
uct subject to suit in the state where the injury occurred the "cor-
poration [must have] deliver[ed] its products into the stream of com-
merce with the expectation that they [would] be purchased by
consumers in the forum State. '" '' The sale involved may not be an
isolated occurrence, but must arise "from the efforts of the manu-
facturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market
for its products in other States."1'
subjective. Woods, supra note 39, at 885-90. Woods devised a three-part analysis
of personal jurisdiction. Part I of the analysis focuses upon "preliminary juris-
diction," and asks whether or not the forum has a legitimate governmental in-
terest in the subject matter of the litigation. Woods, supra note 39, at 880. The
requirements to fulfill this test are minimal. There need be nothing more than
some rational nexus between the forum, the litigation and the parties. Part If
of the analysis discusses "fair notice," a substitute for the literal interpretation
of "purposefully avails." Id. at 880-90. Woods theorizes that the Supreme Court
could not have meant for the courts to interpret this language literally because
an unworkable situation would result. Therefore, he uses Justices Stevens' con-
curring opinion in Shafler, 433 U.S. at 217-19, and the "reasonably anticipates
being haled into Court" language of Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97 (the same sources
cited by White in World-Wide Volkswagen), and concludes that the standard
embodied in the phrase "purposefully avails" is satisfied if a party is not sur-
prised when called upon to defend in a certain forum. Woods, supra note 39 at
887-88. If the tests of Parts I and II are satisfied, the court should proceed to
Part III, the phase of the analysis labeled "fairness factors." The application of
these factors insures that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable, as
they are similar to the factors applied in determining allegations of forum non
conveniens. Some of those considered are:
the relative aggressiveness of the parties, the relative economic
burden of prosecuting or defending the action, the importance of
the governmental interest to be vindicated, the convenience of the
forum from a litigational efficiency point of view, the necessity of
litigation in the chosen forum, the availability of alternative forums
or alternative methods for resolving the dispute, the impact of
the forum's choice of law doctrine, and external constitutional
limitations.
Woods, supra note 39, at 891.
10 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
101 Id. The Supreme Court cited Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Although the assertion of
jurisdiction in Buckeye Boiler probably survived World-Wide Volkswagen, it was
not cited because of its reliance on foreseeability. See notes 76-80 and accom-
panying text supra.
102 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
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Justice Brennan, in one of the three dissenting opinions,'0 '
stressed two major points. First, he noted the impracticality of the
majority's subjective test. He observed that
[i]t may be true, as the Court suggests, that each sincerely intended
to limit its commercial impact to the limited territory, and that
each intended to accept the benefits and protection of the laws
only of those States within the territory. But obviously these were
unrealistic hopes that cannot be treated as an automatic constitu-
tional shield.'
Justice Brennan concluded that if one took the Court's analysis
literally it would "exclude jurisdiction in a contiguous State such
as Pennsylvania as surely as in more distant States such as Okla-
homa.1"' Second, Justice Brennan restated his longstanding oppo-
sition'"' toward the defendant-biased analysis used by the majority.
He advocated eliminating the preference favoring defendants °7
and replacing it with an analysis for determining the propriety of
jurisdiction in which the interests of the forum State, the defend-
ant and the plaintiff would be accorded equal weight.'
III. CONCLUSION
World-Wide Volkswagen represents two major ideas which will
be the governing standards for future exercises of personal juris-
diction: (1) the retention of the preference favoring defendants0 '
and, more importantly, (2) the solidification of a subjective stand-
10 ld. at 581-88. The other dissenting justices were Blackmun and Marshall.
Id. at 568-71.
104lId. at 584. As Justice Marshall stated: "Some activities by their very na-
ture may foreclose the option of conducting them in such a way as to avoid
subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in multiple forums." Id. at 570.
'
05 Id. at 584 n.10.
100 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 256 (concurring in Justice Black's
dissent); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 219; Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. at 101.
'World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 587. Justice
Brennan stated: "I would ...strip the defendant of an unjustified veto power
over certain very appropriate fora-a power that the defendant justifiably enjoyed
long ago when communication and travel over long distances was slow and un-
predictable and when notions of state sovereignty were impractical and exag-
gerated." id. at 587.
108Id. at 586-87.
100 See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
ard as a necessary element before subjecting a defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction.' ° This decision will have its greatest impact
in three areas. First, courts must now apply this subjective element
when determining the propriety of personal jurisdiction. Though
the Supreme Court describes the test as "actual notice' 11 or "pre-
dictability, '... more illuminating guides were not discussed. A
paraphrase of the test may be that the defendant will be amen-
able to jurisdiction if he knew or must have known that his ac-
tivities in a State could subject him to suit in that State. Of course
the problem with a subjective test is trying to decide what the
defendant actually knew. '
Second, state long arm statutes must be reexamined by legis-
latures in light of World-Wide Volkswagen. Although the Court
reaffirmed the defendant-bias, in the next paragraph the Court
stated that a State's interest in adjudicating an action will also be
considered."' The Court on previous occasions has stressed that
this state interest can be evidenced by a special jurisdictional
statute.' Therefore, legislatures in states which have very gen-
eral long arm statutes which reach to the limits of the 14th Amend-
ment should consider enacting very specific statutes. Of course, this
can lead to an anomolous situation since a plaintiff in a state with
a general long arm statute which extends jurisdiction to the consti-
,oSee notes 98-102 and accompanying text supra.
"I World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
112 Id.
"1 See generally Woods, supra note 39, at 885-90. Woods stated: "To ascribe
to the corporate entity qualities of cognitive intent . . . stretches even the most
creative legal imagination." Id. at 885. The subjective standard will be very
difficult for courts to apply and the defendant's possession of such a subjective
intent will be even more difficult to prove. One only wonders when a case such
as Justice Brennan's hypothetical will occur and what the Court's reaction to it
will be. Justice Brennan noted that under the majority's analysis jurisdiction would
be excluded not only in a distant State such as Oklahoma but also in a contiguous
State such as Pennsylvania. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100
S. Ct. at 584 n.10. The hypothetical question is what would have been the result
if the plaintiff in this case had been a resident of Philadelphia which is just across
the Delaware River from New Jersey? Moreover, would the result differ if the
accident occurred in a distant state such as Oklahoma or if it was shown that
while the defendant did not advertise on television stations located in Philadelphia,
those residents nonetheless saw the advertisements which were broadcast on sta-
tions just inside New Jersey? Would the plaintiff have to show that the defendant
meant for residents in Pennsylvania to see such commercials and act on them?
114 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 564.
113 See notes 30-32, 35, 52-53, 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tutional limits may be denied personal jurisdiction, while if the state
had a special jurisdictional statute evincing its interest in such suits
the exercise of jurisdiction would be proper." In effect the Court
seemed to imply that the scope of the current constitutional limits
may be expanded by the showing of stronger state interest through
specific long arm statutes."'
Finally, World-Wide Volkswagen will have its most dramatic
impact in products liability suits. Since it is no longer sufficient
simply to show that the defendant placed his products into the
stream of commerce in order to obtain personal jurisdiction, the
real issue is what proof must be offered. The Court stated that the
sale must arise "from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor
to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its products in other
States.'1 8 To show this, the plaintiff will probably have to resort
to evidence of the defendant's marketing and advertising schemes."
Michael Ernest Dillard
110 See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
11 This is not to say that jurisdiction will exist in the absence of any con-
tacts; however, in determining whether or not the contacts are such that they
are "minimum," i.e., whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, a
State with a specific long arm statute will be able to exercise personal jurisdiction
to a greater extent than a State with a general grasping long arm statute because
of the state interest evidenced by the specific long arm statute. Accord, Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 98. See also Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d
306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980) (permitting jurisdiction in a child custody
suit over a nonresident parent who did not have the traditional minimum con-
tacts with the state on the basis that this was a case dealing with the status of
an individual and because the forum state had a strong state interest in adjudicat-
ing the case as evidenced by a specific long arm statute).
1World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
119 Although showing the propriety of the Court's assertion of personal juris-
diction is a prerequisite to all lawsuits, the possible factual situations of aviation
cases can make this especially troublesome. Consider the questions raised below
in light of the subjective element presented in World-Wide Volkswagen, remem-
bering that the particular facts of the case are critical to the court's exercise
of jurisdiction.
A commercial aircraft flies over State X, the airline which owns the plane is
not incorporated in that state, nor does it have any offices there. The plane
crashes and relatives of some of the deceased passengers bring suit in State X. The
cause of the crash is unknown.
a. Suit is brought against the airline and its employees.
(1) Is State X one over which the airline regularly flies or is it a state
over which the airlines flew for the first time on the day of the crash (because
of unusual circumstances, e.g., bad weather)?
(2) Is the airline a commercial or commuter carrier?
(3) Is the airline a national or regional carrier?
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b. Suit is brought against the manufacturer of a defective product which
might have caused the crash. Assuming that the manufacturer is neither incor-
porated nor does business in State X, consider:
(1) Is the product used primarily in aircraft or is it used for multiple
purposes?
(2) What is the volume of sales of the product?
(3) What is the distribution pattern of the product?
(4) Is the manufacturer a foreign or domestic company?(5) Has the manufacturer advertised this particular product in State X?
(6) Has the manufacturer advertised any product in State X?
c. Suit is brought against the distributor of the defective product. Assuming
that the distributor is neither incorporated nor does business in State X, consider:
(1) What is the size of the area in which he distributes the product?
(2) Did he have privity with the airline or airline manufacturer?
(3) Is the product used primarily in aircraft or is it used for multiple pur-
poses?
(4) What is the marketing scheme of the distributor?
(5) What is the advertising scheme of the distributor?
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